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A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL
VOTING RIGHTS ACT LIABILITY MAY
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE INTENTIONAL
CREATION OF BLACK REMEDIAL DISTRICTS
CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
KATHARINE INGLIS BUTLER*

Professors Grofinan, Handley, and Lublin's observation that under
some circumstances black candidates can be elected in districtsthat are
not majority black is unimpeachable, as is their observation that a
functional analysis can provide a relatively precise estimate of the
percent black a district needs to be to assure a black victory.
Manipulating a district's boundariesfor the purpose of assuring that
black voters will control the electoral outcome therein, however, is
constitutional only when done in response to proven, or strongly
suspected, racial vote dilution as defined by section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, or in section 5 jurisdictions,to prevent "retrogression" in
minorities' ability to exercise theirpoliticalfranchise.
A functional analysis extended to the entire process leading to
nomination and election can help distinguish circumstances in which
black candidateshave suffered ordinarypoliticaldefeat-for which no
"race-based" relief is warranted-from circumstances where black
citizens suffer diminished opportunity to participate in the political
process on account of race-for which a narrowly tailored race-based
remedy is available. The principalauthorsoutline a functional analysis
to determine the parametersfor a district that, in essence, would serve
as a race-based remedy. My Response extends the functional analysis
to determine when such a remedy is needed, and is therefore
constitutional.
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................
DILUTION, PAST AND PRESENT ...............................................
I.

1433
1434

* Legal Research Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.

B.S., Mississippi State University, 1968; M.Ed., Mississippi State University, 1969; J.D.,
University of Tennessee, 1974.

1432

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

A. The Past: Majority Black Districts,Racial Vote
Dilution, and the Sixty-Five PercentRule ......................... 1434
1. Black Voters' Difficulty Electing Black Candidates
Suggested Unequal Political Influence ....................... 1434
2. Vote Dilution Litigation Challenged Race-Based
Political Inequality ........................................................
1436
3. The Remedy for Dilution-The Origin of the Socalled Sixty-five Percent Rule ...................................... 1438
B. The Present: Black Voters Increasingly Resemble
Other PoliticalInterest Groups.......................................... 1443
1. Steps to Electoral Success Today ................................ 1444
a. Core Supporters ......................................................
1444
b. Supporters to the Polls ............................................ 1445
c. Support Beyond the Core ...................................... 1446
2. A Further Look at Black Candidates and White
V oters .............................................................................
144 7
a. White V oters ............................................................
1447
b. Black Candidates and Their Opposition .............. 1449
c. Contest-specific Factors .......................................... 1450
II.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF VOTE DILUTION LIABILITY ...................................... 1451
A. A FunctionalAnalysis in a LitigationSetting ................... 1451
1. The Gingles Preconditions ........................................... 1453
a. A Minority Group Sufficiently Large and
Geographically Compact to Constitute a
Majority of a Single-Member District ................... 1453
b. A Politically Cohesive Minority Group ................ 1454
c. A Bloc Voting White Majority .............................. 1454
2. The Senate Report Factors .......................................... 1455
B. Legislatorsand the Creationof Majority
Black D istricts...................................................
1458
1. "Standard" Districts That Are Majority Black Do
Not Raise Shaw Problems ............................................ 1459
2. Race-based Adjustments to Comply with Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act .............................................. 1461
3. Race-based Adjustments to Comply with Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act .............................................. 1463
a. The Retrogression Standard .................................. 1463
b. Must Retrogression be Avoided at All Cost? ...... 1465
CONCLUSION .........................................................................................
1467

2001]

REMEDIAL DISTRICTS UNJUSTIFIED

1433

INTRODUCTION

Professors Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and David Lublin
demonstrate that today, black candidates often are elected in districts
that are not majority black.' The factors the authors identify-plus
others they do not-clearly impact how black a specific district must
be to elect a black candidate predictably. That said, how, if at all,
should legislators use this information to inform their redistricting
decisions later this year?
The authors treat lightly the legal basis for deliberately creating
districts to favor black candidates, which, while understandable, given
their focus, implies that minority candidates are entitled to optimal
opportunity districts. Thus, legislators must employ the authors'
"functional analysis" to provide them. The law is quite to the
contrary in that legislators may engage in race-based districting only if
necessary to avoid dilution of minority voting strength, or to avoid
"retrogression" prohibited by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.2
Whether manipulation of a district's racial composition to
enhance the election of a black candidate can be justified requires a
detailed factual inquiry, which may include some of the factors
identified by the authors' analysis. However, a similar analysis
extended to the entire process leading to election, might well
that
demonstrate that vote dilution is not present and, consequently,
3
remedial black districts, however defined, cannot be justified.
While never the only factor, the extent to which black candidates
have been elected in a jurisdiction is important to whether a
districting plan will be found to dilute minority voting strength. Thus,
in light of the focus of the Principal Article, I begin my Response with
a brief consideration of the role of black electoral success in the
evolution of the vote dilution claim and to the emergence of majority
black districts as a remedy therefor.

1. Bernard Grofman, et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual
Frameworkand Some EmpiricalEvidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1396-99,1423 (2001).
2. See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) and the related series of cases
discussed infra notes 128-137 and accompanying text (limiting the state's use of race to
create districts).
3. A jurisdiction subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1994), the so-called preclearance provision-may be required to engage in race-based
districting without regard to whether such action was necessary to avoid racial vote
dilution. Compliance with section 5's no retrogression standard is discussed infra notes
133-137 and accompanying text. Note, moreover, that majority black districts created in
accordance with traditional districting standards require no jurisdiction. However, finetuning the racial percentage of a district almost certainly would involve violating those
standards.
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I. DILUTION, PAST AND PRESENT

A.

The Past: Majority Black Districts,Racial Vote Dilution,and the
Sixty-Five PercentRule

1. Black Voters' Difficulty Electing Black Candidates Suggested
Unequal Political Influence
While clearly not a complete measure, the number of blacks
elected to office is a traditional barometer of black political influence.
Moreover, under-representation of blacks in the ranks of elected
officials no doubt was a powerful impetus to develop a theory to
challenge certain election structures. In 1980, fifteen years after the
1965 Voting Rights Act had effectively removed official barriers to
blacks' political participation, black elected officials were significantly
fewer in number at every level of government than might have been
expected, especially in the states of the Deep South.4 In light of the
history of racial discrimination in the South, it was reasonable to
assume some connection between the paucity of black elected
officials and racial discrimination, past and present. An examination
of steps leading to election from the perspective of a black candidate
helps to establish that connection.
In functional terms, any candidate's chance for election depends
on his satisfying four conditions: (1) identifying a reliable core pool
of voters whose support will put him in striking distance of election;
(2) getting his core supporters to the polls; (3) picking up such
support as is needed from outside the core group; and (4) doing items
(1) through (3) better than his opponents.5
Identifying a core group of supporters was probably a potential
black candidate's easiest task. Within the black community, a black
candidate benefited from his race, which black voters likely viewed as
a short-cut to identifying someone who would reflect their interest.
Furthermore, because more than one black candidate for the same
office would have been rare, merely getting word of his candidacy
into the black community very likely produced a core group of
4. According to a 1980 publication of the Joint Center for Political Studies, blacks,
who were almost 12% of the nation's population, made up only 1% of the nation's elected
officials (this was, however, eighteen times the number serving in 1964). 10 JOINT
CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECrED OFFICIALS

1, 9 (1980).
5. Of course, the first step to election is to run. A partial explanation for the paucity
of black office holders in 1980 was almost certainly an under-supply of blacks with the
resources to support a political campaign.
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supporters. Obviously, his core supporter's percentage of the
electorate was a critical, often determinative factor, in his election.
Getting her core supporters to the polls presented a greater
challenge. The black voting age population otherwise eligible to vote
often represented the outside limits of her core supporters.6
However, significantly depressed registration and turnout among
blacks reduced the candidates' actual core supporters to a percentage
of the electorate that was markedly lower than blacks' percentage of
voting age population.
Clearly a black candidate's most difficult challenge was to pick
up sufficient white votes to be elected. When securing white support
was difficult, a key factor for a black candidate's success would have
been how much of it he needed. After the black percentage of
election day turnout, the most important determinant of the amount
of white support a black candidate needed was the jurisdiction's
method of election-black candidates were almost always more
dependent on white support in at-large, or multi-member, systems
than they were in single-member district systems. A single-member
district election system is designed to provide for actual
representation of neighborhoods, regions, or areas of the
In jurisdictions with significant black
governmental entity.
populations, residential segregation meant that some number of these
districts quite naturally would contain majority black populations.
Once barriers to black registration and balloting were removed,
blacks were able to use their majority status in single-member
districts to elect black candidates.7
Based on the notion that neighborhood and provincial interests
should yield to those of the jurisdiction as a whole, an at-large system
generally included no provision for area-specific representation.
Consequently, black candidates generally needed considerably more
white support for election in at-large systems.
Other structural devices, particularly a majority vote
requirement, and to a lesser extent devices that made elections head6. Thus non-citizens, prisoners, and persons convicted of disenfranchising crimes had
to be subtracted from the voting age population. If these non-voting populations were
disproportionately black, the true potential black electorate would be smaller than the
jurisdiction's black voting age population.
7. A 1981 study of blacks elected to municipal office revealed that in municipalities
in Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Alabama, of at least 5,000 districts with
black populations from 20-55%, sixty-one of sixty-six (92.4%) ward cities, but only
twenty-two of seventy-nine (27.8%) at-large cities, had at least one black elected official.
See Katharine I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election Structures:
Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REV. 851,872-73 (1982).
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to-head contests,8 further increased the degree of white support
needed by a black candidate running in a non-majority black district.
The presence of a majority vote requirement, which was practically
universal in the Democratic primary, meant that even when cohesive
black voters made up a significant segment of the election unit's
voters, their votes alone were insufficient for nomination or election.
In the days when nomination in the Democratic Primary was
tantamount to election, the majority vote requirement deprived black
candidates of the major advantage that they otherwise would have
enjoyed by virtue of having an easily identified core of loyal
supporters.
Theoretically, black votes alone could elect a candidate at-large,
even with a majority vote requirement, if black voters employed a
carefully orchestrated strategy of single shot voting. The efficacy of
this strategy was diminished by staggered terms and was unavailable
when elections were conducted from numbered posts or from
residency sub-districts. 9
The bottom line was that if the election structure mandated more
votes for election than there were black voters, and if a black
candidate could not, or did not, find a means to attract white votes,
defeat was inevitable. The consistent defeat of black candidates
likely was a major impetus to the development of a theory to
challenge election structures that made black electoral success
dependent upon white votes.
2. Vote Dilution Litigation Challenged Race-Based Political
Inequality
1°
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Supreme Court dashed hopes that
numerical under-representation of blacks among elected officials,
alone, would be sufficient to demand a change to an electoral system
more favorable to blacks. The Court rejected the lower court's
theory that vote dilution existed when a cognizable racial'group, with
legislative interests not shared by others, was unable to elect a
member of the group in a multi-member district, but could do so if

8. A "head-to-head" contest is one in which each seat on a legislative body is
separately elected. Single-member district elections are by their nature head-to-head
contests. At-large elections may be made so artificially by the imposition of "posts,"
which divide what would otherwise be an election won by the top vote-getters from a field
of candidates, into a series of head-to-head contests.
9. For a full explanation of the impact of various aspects of the election structure on
black voter's election strategies, see Butler, supra note 7, at 864-68.
10. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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Rather, the Court
single-member districts were substituted."
indicated that, to prevail on a dilution claim, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they have less opportunity to participate in the
political process and elect candidates of their choice than others in
the electorate. It reversed the lower court's decision in favor of the
plaintiffs, finding that there was no evidence that they were not
permitted to register to vote, to participate in the affairs of their
chosen political party, or to be equally represented when the party
selected legislative candidates. The plaintiffs-Democrats in a county
dominated by Republicans-suffered political, not racial, losses the
Court concluded. Their claim of dilution was thus "a mere
euphemism for political defeat."' 2
Having learned from Whitcomb, plaintiffs in White v.
Regester 3-- the next dilution case to reach the Court-stressed not
entitlement to a particular election outcome, but rather race-based
exclusion from the political process itself. They pointed to the impact
of Texas's long history of official racial discrimination on the ability
of minorities to participate in the political process; to racial or racist
political behavior by whites, such as white control of the Democratic
Party slating process, candidates' use of racist campaign tactics, and
bloc voting by white voters; to the impact on minority candidates of
the state's majority vote requirement, and other devices which
increased the percentage of vote needed for election. Evidence that
officials elected in the challenged system were unresponsive to the
interests of their minority constituents affirmed the minority groups'
lack of political influence. 4 The Supreme Court affirmed, stating
simply that the facts found by the court were sufficient to support its
conclusion that the plaintiffs did not have an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their
choice.15
Whitcomb and White thus defined the parameters of vote
A disadvantaged minority group could not expect
dilution.
protection from the normal uncertainties of politics, but it was
entitled to an equal opportunity to participate in the process. If,
considering the totality of the circumstances, a court found that

11. Id. at 130-32.

12. Id. at 153.
13. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
14. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 727-33 (W.D. Tex. 1972), affd, White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
15. White, 412 U.S. at 766-67.
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plaintiffs suffered a diminished opportunity to participate on account
of race, a remedy was to be provided.
Just when the "totality of the circumstances" pointed to "racebased," deprivation proved difficult to determine. In the early days,
courts reasonably could have resolved ambiguous cases by finding
lack of minority political success to be "race-based," rather than
merely a reflection of ordinary politics. Given that passage of the
Voting Rights Act had been necessary to provide blacks with even
the bare essentials for political participation, no leap of logic was
necessary to interpret their under-involvement at every stage of the
process as a lingering effect of very recent discrimination.
Discrimination left the black community with few experienced
political leaders, with few obvious candidates, with no background for
engaging in biracial politics and with few resources to bridge the gap.
A white majority that endorsed, or at least acquiesced in, state
sanctioned discrimination likely would not be eager to put officials in
office who would owe their election to the black minority. At a
minimum, in the first decade following adoption of the Voting Rights
Act, plaintiffs should have prevailed in most dilution claims against
southern jurisdictions. However, the vague standards for dilution,
perhaps when combined with a federal bench still populated by men
who were themselves products of the same racially biased society, led
to inconsistent outcomes not readily reconcilable on their facts.
3. The Remedy for Dilution-The Origin of the So-Called Sixty-Five
Percent Rule
Once a court concluded that racial vote dilution existed,
however, the matter of a remedy was considerably easier, even if, as
Grofman, Handley, and Lublin point out, the formula for correction
proved less than precise. At-large elections were to be dismantled
and replaced by single-member districts. Dilutive single-member
districts were to be redrawn. In either case, some number of the new
districts were to be designed so that the aggrieved group could elect
its candidates of choice without white support.
To make sure black voters were at least a potential majority of
the turnout on election day, some courts adopted a rule of thumb that
a remedial district should be 65% black in population. 6 The courts
reasoned that if a district were drawn to contain a 65% black
population, then 60% of the district's voting age population would be
black, which even with lower black registration rates, would still mean
16. E.g., De Grandy v. Wetherel, 815 F. Supp. 1550,1564 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
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leaving a 5% margin
55% of the district's registrants would be black,
17
turnout.
black
diminished
possible
for
to allow
The likely, if unarticulated, rationale for selecting single-member
districts as the remedy was that this method of election was the
virtually universal alternative to at-large elections in this country.
Although the two methods of election were based on different
notions of the interests to be furthered in elections, both systems had
recognized strengths and weaknesses. That blacks could have elected
representatives from their own neighborhood in a district system, but
could not do so in an at large system, did not distinguish them
sufficiently from others in the electorate. It was, after all, a primary
objective of the at-large system to avoid having individual officials
beholden to any specific segment of the electorate.
However, a finding of dilution theoretically established that the
election system impacted blacks differently than it did others in the
electorate, including residents of other neighborhoods who also were
unable to elect their choices. It seemed a reasonable compromise of
the state's right to select the method of election to insist that it select
an equally well-established alternative system that would provide
electoral benefits to black voters equivalent to those of others in the
electorate. When operating as designed, at-large elections did not
provide any area with a specific representative, but, nevertheless, all
candidates had to satisfy enough of the jurisdiction's voters to be
elected. Thus, all areas could expect that their interests would be
thrown into the mix when governing decisions were made. A racially
malfunctioning at-large system, however, left blacks and their
concerns out of the mix. Substituting single-member districts
deprived everyone of influence over all officials, but gave everyone
the benefits of regional representation.
Although Whitcomb and White made clear that the injury subject
to remediation was race-based diminished political influence, the
failure to tie the injury to abridgment of the right to vote made racial
dilution appear to be just another "disparate impact" claim.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded in Mobile v. Bolden 8 that
the rules governing other disparate impact cases applied to vote
dilution; such claims are actionable only if the state action resulting in
the disparate impact-in the case of dilution, the selection or

17. Because black families, on average, have more children than white families, a
larger portion of the total black population is made up of persons not old enough to vote.
For a general discussion of the Sixty-Five Percent Rule, see id.

18. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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maintenance of the election scheme-was motivated by an intent to
discriminate.
Congress quickly came to the rescue in 1982 by amending section
2 of the Voting Rights Act to restore the Whitcomb-White totality of
the circumstances test. Although the language of section 2 directly
tracks the standard set out in these cases and the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended a statutory return to the pre-Bolden
standards, the courts took the amendment to mean that a more
lenient standard should apply. Relying largely on a series of "factors"
set out in a report prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee-the
so-called "Senate Report Factors"' 9 -the courts found dilution much
more often than they had in the past.2'
The Supreme Court's first construction of amended section 2,
Thornburg v. Gingles2t provided an additional boost to dilution
plaintiffs. While the Court recognized that section 2 had specifically
incorporated the Whitcomb-White standard for dilutionl-a standard
that tied relief to discrimination-the most influential part of the
opinion described the claim in terms that could be read as supporting
a "racial entitlement theory."
The Court explained that the
gravaman of a dilution claim was that multi-member districts
permitted a numerically superior majority, voting as a bloc, to
consistently defeat the minority group's preferred candidates despite
high levels of support from the minority group. A cohesive minority
group was in a position to blame the election system for its losses if
the group members' residential patterns would permit it to elect
candidates without white support in an alternative election system.
Thus, while many factors, including those set out in the Senate
Report, were relevant to the ultimate determination, three conditions
(the now famous Gingles preconditions) were essential: (1) the
minority group must be sufficiently large and sufficiently compact to
19. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. The
committee indicated that a violation of section 2 could be established by a variety of
factors and then listed some typical ones gleaned from pre-Bolden cases. See discussion of
these factors, infra text and accompanying notes 56-61.
20. The lower court decision in Gingles is a good example of a case where the record
of black electoral success was superior to that in most of the pre-Bolden cases that
plaintiffs lost. See Gingles v. Edmiston, 590 F. Supp. 345, 357-60 (E.D.N.C. 1984). Other
examples of cases, where, in my opinion, plaintiffs would not have prevailed during the
pre-Bolden era include: Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. City of
Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984);
Major v. Treen, 547 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).
21. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
22. Id. at 35, 44 n.8; see also id. at 97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) group members
must be politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority must vote
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the minority's preferred
candidates.'
Only the third precondition implied that it was necessary to find
some connection between blacks' lack of electoral success and racial
discrimination. "Whites voting as a bloc" implies that whites have
voted against a black candidate precisely because she was black,
rather than because they found her opponent's qualifications or
positions on the issues more appealing. A majority of the Court
rejected Justice Brennan's definition of the third precondition, which
was that a "legally significant white bloc voting" was present when a
white bloc vote normally was able to defeat the combined strength of
minority support plus white "crossover" votes 4 In the majority's
view, this definition did not adequately distinguish between blacks'
inability to elect their choices on account of race and ordinary
political losses. 25 No doubt in part because of the nebulous nature of
the totality of the circumstances doctrine and the illusiveness of the
distinction between ordinary defeat and race-based losses, most postGingles decisions turned on the presence of the seemingly more
objective and more definable Gingles preconditions.26
In contrast to pre-Bolden judges, who were reluctant to see racial
bias as the underlying explanation for blacks' often glaring lack of
political success, in the decade following Gingles, judges, initially
appeared eager to find that blacks suffered vote dilution when the
evidence did little more than demonstrate that black candidates had
not been proportionally elected. The functional, intensely local, factspecific analysis theoretically called for by Whitcomb-White's
standard, now incorporated into section 2, was "anything but" in
practice. Cohesive black voters were deemed victims of vote dilution
when similarly cohesive, similarly numerous, non-racial interest

23. Id. at 50-51.
24. Id. at 56. Taken literally (as it often was, see, e.g., McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F.
Supp. 588, 592 (E.D.V.A. 1988)), this language implied that if a slight majority of blacks,
say 51%, preferred candidate B, who was also preferred by 49% of whites, but B lost
because 51% of whites and 49% of blacks preferred candidate W, then a legally significant
white bloc voting was present.
25. Gingles,478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 100-01 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
26. See Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, 1016 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Kravitch, J., concurring) ("[P]roof of the three Gingles factors is both necessary and, in
this case, sufficient, for a section 2 vote dilution claim."); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,
441 n.27 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("[S]uch proof is sufficient to make out a prima facie case.").
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groups would simply have been seen as ordinary losers in the political
process. 27

Recent cases, however, suggest a return to Whitecomb-White's
anti-discrimination principles. First, in Johnson v. DeGrandyl the
Court made clear that plaintiffs must not only demonstrate the
existence of the preconditions, but also that the totality of the
circumstances established that they had been denied an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
candidates of their choice. Second, Shaw v. Reno29 and the Supreme
Court's other "affirmative racial gerrymandering" decisions 0
revealed a five justice majority firmly in favor of limiting "race-based
remedies" to "race-based deprivations," which these justices strongly
implied must contain some element of racial discrimination.3 '
Third, a number of circuits articulated new understandings of
Gingles-understandings more firmly tied to the dilution standard's
origins in Whitcomb and White. The Fifth Circuit has held that
section 2's protections only extended to defeats on account of race, so
that when divergent voting patterns were best explained by partisan
affiliation, there was no vote dilution. 32 The Eleventh Circuit has held
that to establish vote dilution, the plaintiffs must demonstrate racial
bias in the electorate, which the challenged electoral scheme allows to
dilute minority voting strength.33 The First Circuit has concluded that
absent racial antagonism in the electorate, the defeat of a minority
candidate "does not prove a lack of electoral opportunity but a lack
of whatever else it takes to be successful in politics (say, failure to ...
reflect the majority's ideological viewpoints). '"34 The Seventh Circuit
has noted that the Voting Rights Act does not guarantee the election
of Democrats, even if black voters support them.35 The Sixth Circuit
has observed that minorities should not be entitled to a remedy,
27. See, e.g., Goosby v. Town of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, passim.(2d. Cir. 1999). The
critical facts of Goosby were virtually indistinguishable from those in Whitcomb.
28. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
29. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
30. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
31. The five justices are the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. In Vera, the Court (with these five justices constituting the majority) notes
that before it employs a race-based remedy, the state must identify specific discrimination,
and must have a strong basis in evidence to conclude that a remedy is needed. 517 U.S. at
1962-63.
32. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th
Cir. 1993) (en banc).
33. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir. 1994).
34. Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973,981 (1st Cir. 1995).
35. Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357,361 (7th Cir. 1992).
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which is unavailable to other supporters of defeated candidates.3 6
These cases signal a return to racial discrimination as the underlying
theory for vote dilution, thus emphasizing that when blacks' preferred
candidates win and lose on the same basis as candidates generally,
race-based remedial districts cannot be justified.
The Present:Black Voters IncreasinglyResemble Other Political
Interest Groups
Despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, times have changed.
The most significant change is simply that much time has passed since
the days of state-imposed segregation and state-sanctioned
disenfranchisement. The further removed the nation is from historic
official discrimination, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish
black voters from other political interest groups, and the less
supportable the assumption becomes that, when black candidates
lose, it is because of race.
Aside from the growing distance from historic discrimination, the
change most directly helpful to the election of black candidates has
been a significant replacement of at-large and multi-member district
election systems with single-member districts-a change prompted by
legal pressure from section 2 and political pressure from minority
groups. These districts now must be redrawn to comply with the
Constitution's so-called "one-person, one vote" requirement.
Because the black electorate continues to provide overwhelming
support to black Democrats, a district's racial composition obviously
will be a key factor in a black candidate's success. However, the
degree to which the legislature lawfully may manipulate the racial
composition of districts will depend upon the existence of a variety of
factors that affect section 2 liability.37 A major factor is the degree to
which black candidates are unable to achieve electoral success
because of their race. Below I reexamine the steps to electoral
success in light of today's racial and political climate.
B.

36. Clark v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807,812 (6th Cir. 1994).
37. Majority black districts created in accordance with traditional districting criteriasuch as by recognizing a geographically-definable community of interest-require no
justification. Moreover, section 5 jurisdictions must use race to create districts, if
necessary to avoid retrogression. See discussion, infra text and accompanying notes 80-92.
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1. Steps to Electoral Success Today
a.

Core Supporters

Black support for Democratic candidates in general and black
Democrats in particular, remains high. However, two important
changes affect the dynamics a black candidate faces in generating and
retaining core supporters. The first is the emergence of a genuine two
party system in the South and the second is that a black candidate
today is likely to have black opposition.
Because a majority of whites prefer the Republican Party, blacks
now constitute a significantly larger segment of the Democratic
primary electorate than of the overall electorate, particularly in the
South. In many districts, blacks will constitute a majority of those
voting in the Democratic primary, but not in the general election. In
these districts, black cohesiveness should propel a single black
candidate to a primary victory over his white opponents. When
multiple black candidates seek the Democratic Party nomination,
which is especially likely when there is no incumbent, none
automatically can count on black voter support. All must expend
greater effort and resources to define and generate their core
supporters. In this effort, they face all the same issues as candidates
generally: gaining name recognition, securing the support of
influential people, obtaining financial backing, and in general putting
together a campaign that attracts sufficient votes to win.
Today in majority black districts, black voters have the luxury
enjoyed by white voters when they are in the majority. They can split
their vote among multiple black candidates, but, if they choose, still
defeat a white candidate who makes the run-off election. Similar to
black candidates in the past, a prospective white candidate may look
at the election math and conclude that the odds against his prevailing
are too great. Moreover, the white electorate may conclude that its
vote is more wisely spent influencing which of the black contenders
will be elected, even if a white candidate runs. If the election
becomes a contest between two black candidates, the party nominee
obviously will be black, but may be determined by the white
minority.38 The degree to which this phenomenon occurs is obviously
a function of the extent to which the contest is characterized by issues
that, or candidates who, polarize the electorate along racial lines.

38. In majority white districts, a cohesive black minority likewise is able to deliver the
outcome determinative vote when whites split their vote among competing candidates.
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Because the presence of competing black candidates means that
race no longer provides one of them with instant supporters, a
candidate who sees black voters as his primary source of core support
may be tempted to sell himself as the "true" advocate of black
interests. As a result, he may pick up the lion's share of the black
vote, but ultimately lose the nomination to a candidate who attracted
white support by focusing on issues that do not divide along racial
lines. If blacks are not a majority of the Democratic primary
electorate in a district, multiple black candidates significantly increase
the odds that the party nominee will be white, particularly if the black
candidates devote their energies to competing for the black vote. The
white candidate meanwhile can focus his campaign on the white
majority, making just enough token appeals to avoid alienating black
voters, whose support he will need in the general election. 9
Winning the Democratic primary may turn out to be less than
half the battle in a genuine two party system. Unless a bitter primary
battle motivates supporters of the loser not to vote in the general
election, or, worse still, to support the Republican, the possibility that
a black nominee from the Democratic party will win the general
election is highly dependent upon the party's strength in the district.
The party label now produces "core supporters" for the black
nominee in the form of the party faithful. If this group is not likely to
be a majority of the general election turnout, the nominee must pick
up additional support from independents. Unlike the primary,
however, the nominee now has the financial and organization support
of the party.
Supporters to the Polls
Candidates who expect to find their primary support among
black voters no longer face racism-driven diminished registration and
turnout. Indeed, the National Voter Registration Act of 199340 (the
so called "Motor Voter Law") makes registration effortless, indeed,
almost involuntary. Thirty-six years after passage of the Voting
Rights Act, it is hard to argue that "continuing effects" of past
discrimination keep blacks from registering or from turning out.
b.

39. When there is no black candidate in the primary, white candidates may actually
devote a disproportionate part of their campaign resources toward attracting black voters.
Blacks are the most easily identified segment of the primary electorate. They often are
the most accessible voters because of well-established channels within the black
community to promote political participation. They often vote reasonably cohesively,
even when all candidates for nomination are white.
40. Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)).
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Making this connection is particularly difficult in light of evidence
that older blacks-who might actually have faced discriminatory
registration practices-participate at much higher rates than younger
blacks.4 '
Today, those in need of black support face mobilization issues
similar to those faced by other candidates. Their would-be supporters
usually are on the registration rolls. The candidate must inspire them
to get out to vote, and perhaps help them to get to the polls. When a
black candidate faces only white opposition, the disadvantage of
having a large number of supporters who may have difficulty getting
to the polls is arguably offset by the greater ease of physically locating
one's core supporters and being able to take advantage of longestablished networks in the black community for turning out the vote.
Mobilization is a larger problem for black candidates in the primary
because party resources are not available to help.
c. Support Beyond the Core
In the general election, a black nominee of the Democratic party
can expect to count most Democrats (not just black ones) as part of
his core support. If the district is majority white, but dominated by
Democrats, support beyond the core is less critical and perhaps even
unnecessary. If it is dominated by Republicans, any Democrat's
chances will be slim. Only when neither party dominates the district
is the outcome likely to depend on which candidate can attract swing
voters. For the most part, these voters are likely to be whites without
a strong affinity for either party.
As is true with generating core support, attracting voters from
outside the candidate's core group is likely to be more complicated in
the Democratic primary. If a candidate faces competition for his core
supporters, he must balance winning those votes and attracting others
from outside the group. Too strong a pitch to black voters may result
in the loss of white votes. Too weak a pitch may result in losing his
core to a black competitor. His task, however, is not markedly
different from that of candidates generally. Moreover, in districts
where neither party dominates, all candidates must avoid taking
41. See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Columbia, 850 F. Supp. 404, 423 (D.S.C. 1993)
(explaining that a study of city's voters found that 85% of blacks age fifty or older were
active registrants, whereas only 66% of blacks between twenty-five and thirty-four were
active registrants). When black registration and turnout lag behind that of whites, the
explanation is likely differences in the age structure of the two populations, rather than
past discrimination. Older people, regardless of race, register and vote at much higher
levels than younger ones. Blacks of voting age are younger overall than whites of voting
age.
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stands that win them votes in the primary but destroy their chances
for attracting sufficient swing votes to prevail in the general election.
Obviously, specific combinations of opponents and a district's
partisan leanings will determine the balance a successful candidate
must strike to put together a winning combination of core supporters
and others. Unless a district is so overwhelmingly black as to make
the white vote largely irrelevant in both the primary and general
elections, however, most black candidates will at some stage need
white votes. Furthermore, the existence of vote dilution-a
circumstance necessary to justify the deliberate creation of black
districts-turns in part on white voters' response to black candidates.
2. A Further Look at Black Candidates and White Voters
Everyone recognizes that many candidates easily elected in
Boston would easily be defeated in Wyoming. It is common
knowledge that a candidate who might defeat his opponent when
both are first-time candidates may have little chance against a popular
incumbent, even if the electorate is exactly the same. Yet, in the
context of vote dilution litigation, the critical determination of
whether black candidates lose "on account of race" is often made as if
the ordinary rules of politics do not apply to black candidates. If one
is to employ a functional analysis to determine why black candidates
lose, that analysis must recognize that specifics do matter in politics
for all candidates, including black ones. Neither white voters, black
candidates, their political opponents, nor the circumstances of
individual elections are fungible. An analysis that lumps white
support for Jesse Jackson for President together with white support
for a well-known black principal for the local school board to arrive at
"average" white support for black candidates is hardly a common
sense means to determine likely white support for a black candidate
for local office.
a. White Voters
In terms of their response to a black candidate's race, white
voters might be seen as falling more or less into the following
categories, which in turn provide some measure of the degree to
which the collective decisions of the white electorate are influenced
by racial bias: (1) voters for whom a black candidate's race is a
positive factor; (2) liberal-leaning voters for whom race is a positive
factor because they view "black" as short-hand for liberal; (3)
conservative-leaning voters for whom race is a negative because they
view "black" as short-hand for liberal; (4) voters for whom race is a

1448

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

negative factor because of their stereotypical belief that any black
candidate is less able than any white candidate;4' and (5) voters who
are so consumed by racial prejudice as to refuse to vote for any black
candidate.
For the final, sixth, category of voters, a candidate's race is
neither a positive nor a negative. Many of these race-neutral voters
will respond, however, to the candidate's partisan label. Whites who
prefer Republicans are not likely to vote for many black candidates
because few are likely to run as Republicans, but those who prefer
Democrats will support a black Democrat on the same basis as they
would support a white one. To gain the support of voters in this
category who lack either a positive or a default preference for her
party, or to gain their votes in the primary, a black candidate must
compete with all others.
A black candidate who needs white votes to win should employ
the same strategy, regardless of the actual mix of white voters in his
district-a fact he is unlikely to know anyway. He must attract
category six voters. If his personal qualities, position on the issues,
and projected viability will not gain the votes of this group, he likely
will lose, as would a similarly situated white candidate. As the
portion of the jurisdiction's white voters in categories three, four, and
five increases, a black candidate's chance for success obviously
decreases. When voters in these categories remain in the Democratic
Party, they are the voters least likely to support the party's nominee
in the general election if the nominee is black. As the portion of the
white electorate that falls into categories four and five goes up, the
more it appears that race, not politics, is responsible for losses
suffered by black candidates. Conversely, when most white voters fall
into category six-as well as one and two-the more difficult it should
43
be to establish that a black candidate has lost for racial reasons.
42. These white voters might change their minds if a black candidate overcomes their
presumption of incompetence.
43. If, as most courts seem now to recognize, white voters' reasons for not supporting
black candidates are important, one party in vote dilution litigation must be assigned the
responsibility of distinguishing "racial reasons" from "political ones." In regions of the
country where the Democratic Party once dominated all elections, it may be very difficult
to determine the degree to which blacks' ascendancy in that party is responsible for
whites' gravitation to the Republican Party. The correlation between these two events
appears to be obvious, but both events are equally associated with southern Democrats
becoming more liberal and Republicans becoming more conservative nationally. I leave
for another day questions of how to decide whether a white Republican falls into
categories three (conservatives who see blacks as liberals) or six (voters who see race as
neutral), rather than four (voters with stereotypical, but rebuttable, views about blacks) or
five (racists).
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Black Candidates and Their Opposition

The average person likely would say that he selects a candidate
in large part because of the candidate's personal qualities versus those
of others in the race. However, dilution plaintiffs-and political
scientists looking for objective factors to quantify-downplay the
impact of individual black candidates' personal qualities on the
They argue that these
degree of white support forthcoming.
candidates had qualities that generated overwhelming support from
black voters-thus suggesting that if this does not translate into white
support, race must be the reason. It is just as logical, however, to
argue that a black voter votes for a black candidate because of the
message the candidate's race conveys to him. Perhaps many black
voters are motivated to support a black candidate out of a perceived
commonality of interests and sense of community pride, and less
motivated by their perceptions of the candidate's background,
qualifications, and character. For example, such factors may have
motivated black voters to vote overwhelmingly for Alcee Hastings,
despite his removal from the federal bench, and for Marion Berry
despite his trouble with the law. 4
Few white voters are likely to support a black candidate solely
because they perceive a positive political message from his race.
More will be needed. Their failure to support candidates with
obvious political liabilities should not be seen as evidence of the
degree of support white voters would provide a black candidate
without similar liabilities.
Most voters consider a candidate's political viability when
deciding to support him. For a variety of reasons, however, black
voters may be more willing than white ones to cast a symbolic vote.
An example might be their overwhelming support of Jesse Jackson in
his various attempts to secure the Democratic nomination for
President, even though few, perhaps including Jackson himself, saw
him as a viable candidate. That whites were unwilling to trade
influence for symbolism cannot be equated with racial bias.
Moreover, it would be untenable for a savvy political advisor to
counsel a black candidate for, say, the state legislature, to see very
low white voter support for Jackson as a barometer of the support he
could expect.

44. Moreover, some blacks may have seen Hastings's and Berry's difficulties as a
product of a racially discriminatory justice system-a view most whites would not have
shared. Hastings's impeachment by Congress was later overturned by a federal judge. He
subsequently was elected to Congress from a majority black district.
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Her opponent is obviously an important factor affecting the
degree of support any candidate can expect. Yet, when it comes to
evaluating white support for black candidates in vote dilution
litigation, the actual identity of the opponent is downplayed and often
totally ignored. When a long-term white incumbent has routinely
soundly beaten all white opponents, it simply defies logic to conclude
anything "racial" about a black candidate's suffering a similar fate.
Similar observations can be made about whites' support of white firsttime candidates, if whites reasonably could have seen these
candidates as having more attractive personal attributes,
qualifications for office, and positions on the issues than their black
opponents.
c.

Contest-specific Factors

Factors beyond the personal characteristics of the candidates also
influence election outcomes. All Democrats may benefit, or be
undermined, by the popularity of the top of the ticket. Other
elections involving the district's voters may impact turnout, or may
dictate the amount of the party's resources to be devoted to a black
candidate's specific election contest. Off-year elections often are
characterized by lower voter turnout and non-partisan local elections
and special elections even more so. Incidents unrelated to a contest
per se may influence the outcome, including matters as simple as the
impact of weather on turnout and as complex as the community's
response to some highly publicized, overtly racist act. Election
dynamics are also office specific. Candidates for city council and
candidates for governor must implement very different campaign
strategies. Friends and neighbors may be critical supporters in local
elections, but virtually immaterial in congressional ones.
To summarize, a common sense inquiry into the causes for black
candidates' losses requires an examination of all factors that influence
electoral outcomes, including the backgrounds, qualifications, and
political views of black candidates and those of their opponents, as
well as the partisan and ideological leaning of the electorate. An
"equal opportunity" for election should be seen as existing for a black
candidate when her opportunity is the same as that of a white
candidate sharing the black candidate's pertinent personal and
political qualities. Otherwise, the Voting Rights Act, which was
enacted as a shield against racial discrimination, becomes instead a
sword for the advancement of interest group politics.
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II. SUGGESTIONS FOR A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
VOTE DILUTION LIABILITY45
Congress indicated that "abridgment of the right to vote on
account of race" was the injury to be remedied by section 2, its
statutory substitute for Whitcomb and White's constitutional dilution
claim. Ultimately, to prevail on a section 2 claim, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that, based on the totality of the circumstances, their
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
candidates of their choice is sufficiently unequal to abridge the right
to vote, and that the inequality is on account of race. A functional
analysis of the totality of the circumstances should be designed to
define inequality and to distinguish race-based inequality from
standard political losses.
A FunctionalAnalysis in a LitigationSetting
An individual is an equal participant in the political process if he
has the opportunity to register, to cast a ballot, to associate with and
participate in the political party of his choice, to join with like-minded
others to support candidates or issues, to seek elected and appointed
political office, and to have his vote be given equal weight when
elections are decided. To be an equal participant does not mean, as
all of us who vote know, the right to have one's candidates elected or
one's views prevail.
For a group, an equal opportunity to participate means that its
collective votes should have the same weight in the political process
as the collective votes of other groups similarly situated. Like the
individual voter, a group has no right to have its candidates or policies
prevail in a majoritarian system. Many purely political groups never
experience electoral or policy success, and any notion that as a
general proposition, whites qua whites have elected all their choices if
all the candidates elected are white, is patently untenable.46 True,

A.

45. Despite giving lip service to a "functional analysis" of the political process, courts
rarely actually perform one. Rather, a court's analysis more often appears to be a
mechanical "checking off" of the Gingles preconditions and the Senate Report factors,
with little consideration given as to why these factors do or do not indicate lack of equal
opportunity to participate in the political process on account of race. In this section, I
provide suggestions for how a functional analysis should take place. Hopefully it will be
obvious to the reader that my views, which are based on twenty-five years of thinking
about the issue of racial vote dilution, are not necessarily shared by the courts.
46. There was a time in much of the South when the overarching political concern of
most white voters was indeed addressed merely by the fact that all successful candidates
were white. Ordinary political and interest divisions within the white electorate were
secondary to racial concerns. First, the white primary and then massive black
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blacks are different from other groups whose members share
common interests in that many of their interests can be traced to a
shared history of discrimination-a discrimination maintained by
depriving them of political influence.
But the appropriate
compensation is to protect group members' political participation
from the majority's hostility when that hostility is directed toward
their race.4 7 The protection should extend only to putting them on
equal footing with others similarly situated, if indeed they are not on
equal footing already.
That said, however, a cohesive bloc of voters should have some
demonstrable influence on the political process, so long as members
of the group have the same representation concerns, broadly
speaking, as others in the electorate. 48 How much influence and how
often that influence should include electing its first choice candidates
depends-as it would for any group-on the group's size,
cohesiveness, and its particular political agenda.
After some measure of expected influence is defined, the group's
actual influence must be measured. If there is a disparity between
expected and actual influence, the remaining question is whether the
disparity is "race-based." Below I examine how the factors the
Supreme Court has identified as relevant to proof of a section 2
violation might contribute to a functional analysis designed to answer
these questions.
disfranchisement permitted divisions within the white electorate to be expressed without
fear that one faction or another would seek an advantage by forming an alliance with
black voters. After the Voting Rights Act gave blacks unfettered access to the ballot,
forgoing black support was a viable political option only if to seek it would lose a
candidate more white votes than he would gain in black votes. Today, a vote dilution
claim easily should be won against a jurisdiction where intra-white political competition
remains suppressed by concerns about black influence or where political divisions within
the white electorate remain secondary to racial concerns.
47. Indeed, it is the fact that group members were victims of historic official
discrimination affecting the right to vote that justifies protecting them from their irrational
unpopularity with the majority. The law does not protect others in the electorate who
might, because of an immutable characteristic, also be victims of the electorate's bias.
One might note that women were disfranchised even longer than blacks and argue that
they, too, should receive special protection. Assuming that a constitutional basis for relief
could be found, the brief response is that to state a claim, women would have to
demonstrate that their opportunities today are unequal, that an alternative wellrecognized electoral system would provide a remedy and women would be sufficiently
unified in their political interests to benefit from its adoption.
48. By this I simply mean that they are interested in the ordinary concerns addressed
by government policies, such as health, education, common welfare, and the like, and in
services the government provides. They are not identified primarily with an agenda
inconsistent with the interests of most citizens, support for which is a litmus test for their
votes.
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1. The Gingles Preconditions
A Minority Group Sufficiently Large and Geographically
Compact to Constitute a Majority of a Single-Member
District
The most obvious purpose of this requirement is to make certain
that if dilution is established, an alternative, standard method of
election is available as a remedy. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court
explained the compactness requirement as essential to the group's
ability to benefit from a single-member district,49 but did not actually
explain why the remedy should be single-member districts. Other
electoral schemes, such as limited voting and cumulative voting,
would permit a politically cohesive group to elect its choice, even if it
were not geographically compact. By including a reference to singlemember districts as an essential element of the claim, however, the
Court implies that the group's interest in an undiluted vote must be
balanced against the state's interest in selecting its method of
election. The state will not be forced to adopt an election system not
common in this country. 0
As the Principal Article demonstrates, blacks do not always have
to constitute an actual majority of the voters to elect their choices
from a single-member district.5 1 I disagree, however, as to whether
something less than a majority of the voters will suffice to satisfy the
first precondition. The very essence of a dilution claim is that a racial
minority needs a single-member district to insulate its votes from the
majority's racial bias. This claim is inconsistent with the assertion
that some majority voters can be relied upon to vote with the group.
Moreover, if federal law is to supplant local control over the method
of election, it is reasonable to insist that it only do so when the
remedy puts some number of electoral outcomes strictly in the hands
of the aggrieved group.52
a.

49. 478 U.S. 30,50 n.17 (1985).
50. Perhaps the Court was concerned that imposing a non-geographically based
representation scheme on the states would infringe so drastically on matters left to the
states as to raise federalism concerns. All of these systems provide some form of
proportional representation that promotes direct representation of groups, political and
otherwise-representation which is not available in the geographically based
representational systems almost universally adopted in this country. Thus, their
imposition on the states would change not merely the method of election, but the very
definition of the underlying interest represented.
51. Grofman et al., supra note 1, at 1396-99, 1423.
52. A change in the method of election, or even in the district lines, may produce a
change in voter and candidate behavior. Unless the minority is a majority of the district, it
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b. A Politically Cohesive Minority Group
The purpose of this precondition is to establish that group
members have common political goals that they see as capable of
furtherance by the political process. Moreover, the group will not
benefit from a single-member district if it is not politically cohesive.
Standing alone, group members' routine support for Democrats does
not establish that they have interests that distinguish them from other

voters who generally favor the nominees of the Democratic party.
The inquiry should be two-fold. First, does the group overwhelmingly
identify with one party when the elections at issue are partisan
contests? 53 If not, there is insufficient internal support for a political
agenda to support the existence of unique "black" interests. Second,
is the group coherent without regard to the Democratic label? If not,

the group looks like just one more subset of Democrats.
c. A Bloc Voting White Majority
This precondition is the means by which the white majority
prevents the election of candidates favored by blacks. To establish
this precondition, plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate that
there is in fact a "bloc" of whites that votes "as whites" against blacks

"as blacks." This condition should not be satisfied by evidence that
Republicans (most of whom are white) vote against Democrats (some
of whom are black). It may be satisfied, however, if white Democrats
vote as a bloc against the choices of cohesively voting black
Democrats, and both "bloc" and "against" are defined so that when a
"white bloc" is present, the defeat of black choices can reasonably be
attributed to racial bias. 4 It may also be satisfied when, within the
cannot be assured of the opportunity to control the election outcome. Moreover, insisting
upon the existence of a group that can by its numbers alone control elections in a district
provides a bright-line element in an otherwise highly subjective standard.
53. Tentatively, I would define "overwhelmingly" as in excess of 80%, which would
mean that in most places, blacks would clearly satisfy the first hurdle.
54. The term "white bloc" implies something more than simply the race of the persons
voting. It would be nonsensical to describe some segment of the electorate as a "white
bloc" in an all white town. "White" is a relevant description only in relation to some nonwhite group. The term implies that a significant portion of whites consistently votes
together "as whites" and against "blacks," or black interests. The term further implies
that it is race to which the bloc responds with its collective votes, and not some other
characteristic of the candidates. For example, if in a general election the Democratic
nominee is black and the Republican nominee is white, an analysis of voting preferences
by race might show that 90% of blacks, but only 35% of whites had supported the black
candidate. If, however, only 35% of whites in the district on average support white
Democratic nominees, it is not accurate to see whites as bloc voting against the black
candidates. The more accurate description is that Republicans are voting against
Democrats. Of course, as the percentage of whites who are Republicans goes up, the
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same electorate, black Democratic nominees lose in the general
election when similarly situated white nominees do not. The district,
candidate, and contest specific variables discussed earlier should also
be relevant considerations on the issue of whether racial bias in the
white electorate is responsible for the defeat of candidates preferred

by the black community 5

2. The Senate Report Factors
The Senate Report lists a hodge-podge of factors, gleaned from
the pre-Bolden vote dilution cases, which were to guide the courts in
their quest to determine if a challenged election structure resulted in

dilution of a minority's voting strength.56 The Report, however,
provides little guidance as to how these factors are to aid the inquiry
and rarely have courts explained how the presence or absence of
these factors aided their ultimate conclusions. Below I propose a role
for each factor as part of a function analysis to answer the questions
that underlie racial vote dilution: Is minority political participation
unequal?; Is racial bias the reason?; and Does a remedy exist?
One Senate Report factor, "racial polarization," is essential to a
finding of dilution because it is the primary basis for determining the
existence of a politically cohesive minority and a bloc-voting majority.
A second factor, a history of official racial discrimination affecting the
right to vote, also should be essential because it is the condition that
justifies protecting racial minorities from their irrational, race-based
unpopularity with the majority, when equivalent protection is not
white bloc and Republican bloc will look increasingly similar. Other evidence must be
examined to determine whether "white" or "Republican" best characterizes the "bloc"
and whether "black" or "Democrat" best describes that which the bloc votes against.
55. Despite our focus on the election of black candidates, the courts are not in
agreement as to how much importance to attach to the race of a candidate when deciding
whether the "choices of the minority" are usually defeated by racial bias. The common
sense answer should be that white voters' response to a black candidate is some evidence
of their racial attitudes, but just how probative it is depends upon the candidate's nonracial characteristics, and those of his opponent, that legitimately influence political
popularity. A related issue in dilution litigation is whether white candidates can count as
black voters' candidates of choice.
56. The factors include: a past history of discrimination affecting voting; the presence
of racially polarized elections; the use of election devices that enhance the opportunities
for discrimination against minorities; denial of minority access to a candidate slating
process, if one existed in the jurisdiction; the degree to which minorities still bear the
effects of discrimination that hinder their participation in the political process; the
presence of racial appeals in campaigns, and the extent to which minorities have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprintedin
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. Unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority concerns and
the presence of unusually large election districts could, in some circumstances, be relevant.
Id.
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provided for other unpopular groups. Both factors make additional
contributions to functional analysis.
The Senate Report factors relevant to the existence of present
day racial bias in the electorate include the following: the presence of
racially polarized voting; a past history of official and private
discrimination affecting voting and otherwise; racial appeals in
campaigns; exclusion of blacks from a slating process; a dramatic
underrepresentation of blacks among elected officials; significant lack
of responsiveness of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
minority, and a tenuous policy behind adoption or maintenance of the
challenged election system.
A common sense analysis must be applied to determine whether
these factors contribute to a finding of present day bias. For example,
blatantly discriminatory laws of the 19th century say little about the
views of the present electorate. A plaintiff alleging racial appeals
should demonstrate that the remarks alleged to be an appeal to
racism were clearly viewed as such by the electorate, 7 and actually
The degree of
attracted more white votes than it lost.
underrepresentation of blacks among elected officials should be
substantially below expectations before it raises an inference that
something is amiss.58
Those Senate Report factors that are relevant to the degree of
white support that black voters need to elect those candidates of
choice help determine whether their opportunity will be unequal.
These factors are the presence of a majority vote requirement, antisingle shot provisions, and other devices that increase the portion of
the total vote needed for election.59
The Senate Report Factor, "the extent to which group members
bear the effects of discrimination in education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability participate in the process," is
relevant to establish a connection between racial discrimination and
Plaintiffs should be
present depressed political participation.
57. If it takes an expert on racial appeals to explain to a local federal judge why an
appeal is racial, the voters probably did not see it as such.
58. Factors such as the group's relative and absolute size are important when
evaluating legitimate expectations that a member group should be elected. The inquiry
concerning minorities elected to office in the jurisdiction should be broader than the office
elected by the system under challenge. The group's more politically viable candidates may
have chosen to seek offices other than those involved in the challenge. For example, if a
county's black population is concentrated within a city, black candidates may have been
far more interested in city offices than county ones if, as is typical, county government has
little day-to-day impact on residents of incorporated areas.
59. See earlier discussion, supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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required to demonstrate that participation-in the form of
registration and turnout-is in fact depressed, that the jurisdiction did
in fact discriminate in these areas, and a rational basis to infer a
connection between the two exists. 6°
The Senate Report factors relevant to tangible indications of the
group's influence, or lack thereof, on the political process at issue
provide evidence of inequality. These factors are the extent to which
members of the group have been elected to office and significant lack
of responsiveness to the particularized needs of the group. Voters see
a tangible result from their political participation when candidates
they have supported are elected and when their past support, or
promised future support, of elected officials brings about government
action on matters of concern to them. These factors should be
measured against expectations, and for this purpose the inquiry
should be specific to the office in question.
The Senate Report factors do not exhaust the information
possibly relevant to the analysis. Note, for example, that neither the
preconditions nor the Senate Report factors address the question of
the degree of influence a group reasonably should expect to have.
Frequently the courts ignore the reality that politics is a game of
numbers. 62 Any legitimate expectations of influence should take into
account the group's absolute numbers, relative size, and
demonstrated cohesiveness in the election system challenged.63 For
60. See discussion, supra note 41, concerning the impact of age on political
participation as an alternative explanation for racial difference in registration and turnout.
61. The courts have tended to downplay "responsiveness" of elected officials, perhaps
because it is so much in the eye of the beholder. It can, however, be powerful evidence of
access, or lack of access, to the ultimate fruits of political participation. The following
questions should be addressed: What does this governmental entity do as an elected
body? If it establishes policy, are minority interests considered and do they prevail as
often as should be expected, given the group's size, its needs, and those of the jurisdiction
as a whole? If the elected body provides services, does the group receive equal access to
them?
62. Many simply assume that proportional representation is the measure of a group's
expected influence, despite the fact that there is absolutely no evidence that other
groups-including, typically, voters who support the state's minority political party-are
proportionally represented. If it is not abnormal for there to be no Republicans on an atlarge city council when Republicans make up only 20% of a city's electorate, the same
conclusion should be reached about a similarly situated minority group-as, for example,
when blacks make up only 20% of the Democratic primary electorate.
63. In Gingles, Justice O'Connor implied that the measure of undiluted voting
strength is the influence the group could expect to have in a single-member district system.
478 U.S. at 91, 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, while comparing the group's
influence in the challenged system to its potential influence in a single-member district
system tells us whether this remedy will be effective, it tells us nothing about whether the
challenged at-large system has resulted in unequal treatment for minorities. An at-large
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example, any group making up 40% of the electorate legitimately
should expect to elect some of its first choices routinely in an at-large
system. A group constituting only 10% of the electorate, however,
must expect to make its influence felt by forming coalitions with
others and cannot realistically expect routinely to find sufficient help
to elect its first choices. The group's absolute size is also important.
A group constituting 10% of a rural county with a total population of
only 5,000 may be quite different in terms of its supply of politically
viable candidates from a group constituting 10% of a city of 500,000.
Ultimately, to be provided a race-based remedial district,
plaintiffs must prove that, considering the totality of the historical,
social, and political circumstances, they have less opportunity than
others in the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect candidates of their choice.
B. Legislators and the Creationof Majority Black Districts64
I began my Response to the Principal Article with the
observation that the Constitution strictly limits the degree to which65
legislators may engage in race-based districting. In Shaw v. Reno
and its progeny,66 the Supreme Court held that "race for race's sake"
is not a legitimate basis upon which to assign citizens to districts.
Nothing, however, prevents a jurisdiction from deliberately creating
majority-minority districts that otherwise conform to traditional
districting criteria-such as by recognizing geographically definable
communities of interest that are black. Legislators also may use race
to create districts to avoid retrogression as prohibited by section 5 of
system, by design, has a different impact than single-member districts on the electoral
opportunities for all voters. If, as has always been true, at-large systems are rational and
constitutional, why should minorities, and only minorities, be deemed to be "unequally
affected" by an at-large system when they fail to achieve the electoral success that would
be possible in a different system?
64. The format here does not permit a full exploration of the issues legislators must
resolve in order to employ race to construct districts. I explore this and other issues
surrounding redistricting, as well as provide concrete line-drawing advice in Katherine
Butler, Redistricting in the Post-Shaw Era: A Small Treatise, Accompanied by Districting
Guidelines, for Legislators, Litigants, and Courts (Sept. 25, 2001) (unpublished, on file
with North Carolina Law Review).
65. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
66. Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995). The Court split five to four in all of these cases. The Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas voted against the state's position in
all cases except Cromartie. In Cromartie,Justice O'Connor joined the dissenting Justices
from the earlier cases in concluding that race was not the predominant factor producing
North Carolina's redrawn Twelfth Congressional District.
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the Voting Rights Act, or to avoid potential liability for racial vote
dilution under section 2 of the Act.
1. "Standard" Districts That Are Majority Black Do Not Raise Shaw
Problems

A key issue of immediate concern to legislators facing
redistricting is one controlled by Justice O'Connor's position in Bush
v. Vera,67 a Shaw progeny decision for which there was no majority
opinion.6 This key issue is whether any circumstances exist in which
the legislature may use race to create districts without triggering strict
scrutiny. According to Justice O'Connor, strict scrutiny is triggered
only when traditional districting criteria have been subordinated to
race. 69 Thus, strict scrutiny will not apply if traditional districting
criteria are actually followed, even if race is a major basis for
construction of the district. Moreover, if traditional districting
criteria were violated for some reason other than race-most likely
incumbency protection and partisan advancement-strict scrutiny
would not be triggered. 70
It is possible to read Justice O'Connor's opinion as permitting
legislators to begin their districting process by using race to create as
many compact minority districts as feasible, even if they would as a
67. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
68. Justice O'Connor's position in Vera controls on a number of issues because she
occupies the middle ground between the remaining Shaw majority justices and Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
69. Vera, 517 U.S. at 959.
70. In an ironic turn of events, as a result of the Shaw line of decisions, incumbency
protection and partisan advantage-seeking have acquired an aura of respectability. North
Carolina, for example, escaped strict scrutiny of its redrawn Twelfth Congressional
District by convincing Justice O'Connor that partisan politics, rather than race, explained
its deviation from traditional districting criteria. See Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. at 1466, where
Justice O'Connor voted with the Court's more liberal Justices to reject the district court's
finding that race, rather than politics, was the predominant factor in the district's creation.
Justice Breyer, author of the opinion, went so far as to describe the State has having
"articulated a legitimate political explanation for its districting decision." Id. at 1458. (The
only explanation offered was partisan advancement.) Texas went even further when it, in
effect, argued in Vera that partisan advancement and incumbency protection were its only
districting standards. (It asserted that it did not have any traditional districting standards
and described incumbency protection as a state interest.) Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp.
1304, 1333 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). To be sure,
gerrymandering for incumbency protection and partisan advancement has always been a
practice, but surely not a districting principle. Indeed one purpose for developing
districting principles was to curb the tendency of incumbents and partisans to seek
advantage over their opponents. Shaw and its progeny's observation that there is no
constitutional prohibition against these practices is not, of course, an endorsement.
Moreover, in some jurisdictions violations of traditional districting standards for personal
and partisan advancement may give rise to state law claims.

1460

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

consequence thereof then be forced to ignore standard districting
criteria to accommodate the jurisdictions' remaining representational
interests. 7 ' However, there are several arguments against this
reading. First, it elevates form over substance. While assigning
voters to distorted districts on the basis of their race heightens the
constitutional injury,72 racial assignment to "neat" districts
nevertheless constitutes a racial assignment. If a compact minority
district can be created only by violating traditional districting
standards in other districts, race has in fact caused the violation.
Second, compactness is just one traditional districting criterion. A
compact district that violates other criteria for racial reasons is still
one in which racial concerns dominate. Finally, if state law mandates
compliance with traditional districting criteria, distorted non-minority
districts may be subject to challenge on state grounds.
A more sensible, and perhaps more plausible, interpretation of
Justice O'Connor's position is that, when race corresponds to some
race-neutral basis upon which districts are traditionally createdmost typically a geographically identifiable "community of
interest"--there obviously is no problem with following traditional
districting criteria, even when the result is a deliberately created
majority black district. In light of the ambiguity in Justice
O'Connor's position, a legislature's safer course of action is to resist
any suggestion that it start its line-drawing process by creating
compact black districts before considering any of its other
redistricting goals.
Indeed, the wiser course of action would be for a legislature to
turn off the racial identification information in its computer
redistricting program, then create the first draft of its plan using
population, political, and other non-racial data. Communities of
interest should be identified in ways that such communities are
identified when racial data is not relevant---distinct parts of political
subdivisions, neighborhoods, economic communities, and the like.73
71. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958.
72. As noted in Vera,
[s]ignificant deviations from traditional districting principles ... cause
constitutional harm insofar as they convey the message that political identity is,
or should be, predominantly racial. For example [a district boundary that cuts]
across pre-existing precinct lines and other natural or traditional divisions, is not
merely evidentially significant; it is part of the constitutional problem insofar as it
disrupts nonracial bases of political identity and thus intensifies the emphasis on
race.
Id at 980-81 (plurality opinion).
73. There is substantial evidence, including their documented political cohesiveness,
that blacks view themselves as sharing many common interests, without regard to
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Even incumbency protection for black incumbents can be
accomplished without specifically looking at race.7 4 Legislatures can
build districts favorable to incumbents by looking at how voters have
actually voted, not by making assumptions about how they will vote
based on their race. If the political party in control pushes for
partisan advantage, or if the major parties agree to recognize each
other's existing strength, the better route is not to use black voters as

a short-cut to finding sure Democratic votes. Precinct-level election
data is more time consuming to use, but it is a more accurate

indication of future voter behavior and does not raise constitutional
problems." If race-neutral criteria determine the first draft of a
districting plan, legislators will have an easier time determining the
race-conscious adjustments they may make to accommodate genuine
interest-based communities, which are black, but which were
unwittingly divided in the draft, as well as the race-conscious
adjustments they must make to accommodate the Voting Rights
76

Act.

2. Race-based Adjustments to Comply with Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act
Much of the discussion here has focused on racial vote dilution,
which is actionable under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In the
geographic proximity to one another. Probably similar evidence exists for union members
and conservative Christians. However, when line drawers take communities of interest
into account, they generally do so only when the community can be defined
geographically, without consulting the census, and otherwise can fit comfortably within a
sensible district. Thus, to follow standard districting criteria, a black population
concentration should be seen as a candidate for a community of interest district only if the
district is one that might have been created if the population concentration were a nonracial interest group.
74. A more supportable principle upon which to protect incumbents indirectly is
"constituency consistency," which merely recognizes that voters have an interest in
remaining in their existing districts. Their interests include such matters as being able to
benefit from keeping a "responsive" incumbent in office (or throwing the rascal out, as the
case may be) to not having district political organizations and alliances disrupted by
drastic changes in the make-up of the district's electorate. Moreover, often constituency
consistency can be maintained without producing seriously distorted districts.
75. Apparently, it was North Carolina's use of precinct-level voting behavior-albeit,
voting behavior that correlated very heavily with the racial make up of the precincts-to
construct districts that saved the State's Twelfth Congressional District from strict
scrutiny. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452, 1466 (2001).
76. If the legislative body produces a first draft of its plan and makes as many political
adjustments as necessary without using racial information, any remaining adjustments
thought to be necessary to satisfy the Voting Rights Act can be clearly separate from the
remainder of the plan. If a court later disagrees with the state's justification for using race,
or its narrow tailoring, these adjustments can be made with minimal disruption to the
remainder of the plan.
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last round of redistrictings, an unfounded interpretation of section 2
encouraged by civil rights groups and the Voting Section of the U.S.
Department of Justice led many of the nation's legislative bodies to
engage in rampant race-based districting in contravention of their
own guidelines. This round, similar pressure may be backed by an
equally unfounded claim that section 2 requires jurisdictions to adopt
districts for every geographically compact minority. A correct
statement of the law is that, if the legislature chooses, it may adopt
race-based districts-if it uses race only to the extent necessary to
avoid a violation of section 2, for which there is a strong basis in
evidence to believe otherwise would exist."
To determine potential section 2 liability is no small feat.
Regardless of whether the courts apply a checklist approach or a
functional analysis to determine dilution, the inquiry is fact-intensive
and often requires days of expert and lay testimony for even a small
municipality. No doubt in light of the impracticality of such an
undertaking for legislators and others engaged in redistricting, the
Supreme Court has indicated that a full totality of the circumstances
analysis is not required. It is sufficient to protect the jurisdiction from
Shaw claims if its creation of race-based districts to avoid section 2
liability is based on strong evidence that the three Gingles
preconditions are present. While the jurisdiction must be correct in
its interpretation of the law, it need only be reasonable as to the
factual predicate for its action.
An evaluation for possible section 2 liability should begin with
the first precondition, the one which is most objective and most easily
applied. If, in fact, the state's draft plan already had made routine
accommodations for black incumbents, and if subsequent adjustments
were made as feasible to accommodate black communities of interest,
it is unlikely that there would be many additional compact minority
groups not already contained within districts where they can elect
candidates of their choice.
If there are such groups, and if different districts can be drawn to
accommodate them, while still respecting the state's traditional
districting standards, the state may make the change with little risk
that "strict scrutiny" will be triggered thereby. 8 The risk of a
77. The Court "assumed without deciding" that section 2 would supply a compelling
state interest. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977. Justice O'Connor and the four more liberal justices
would hold that it in fact is a compelling state interest. Id. at 990-993 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. "May make" is the correct description of the state's option. There is no
requirement that a jurisdiction create majority-minority districts, even if it can do so

2001]

REMEDIAL DISTRICTS UNJUSTIFIED

1463

constitutional challenge increases, however, if race is the only basis
for concluding that the group constitutes a community of interest, and
if drawing a district for the group violates other traditional districting
criteria. 79 If the legislature is inclined to draw a race-based district for
a geographically compact minority that, under the circumstances, will
violate standard districting criteria, the legislature should look for
substantial evidence of the remaining two preconditions before
proceeding.
3. Race-based Adjustments to Comply with Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act
a.

The Retrogression Standard

For those jurisdictions subject to its provisions (covered
jurisdictions), section 5 provides the most compelling basis for
creating race-based districts. The burden imposed by section 5 is, in
most circumstances, seemingly relatively slight-the jurisdiction must
not adopt a new districting plan that, when compared to the plan it
replaces, is "retrogressive" of minorities' ability to effectively exercise
the electoral franchise.8 0 In simple terms, to avoid retrogression,
there must be as many districts in which blacks can elect candidates of
their choice in the new districting plan as there were in the old plan,
A covered jurisdiction is thus
absent unusual circumstances.
permitted to employ "race for race's sake" in order to create black
districts if necessary to avoid retrogression.
Obviously a critical question for covered jurisdictions is what
constitutes a "black district" for purposes of measuring retrogression?
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not provided a clear
definition. Moreover, support for various definitions can be found in
the Court's decisions. In Beer v. United States, the origin of the
retrogression standard, the Court spoke in terms of blacks being a

without violating standard districting criteria. Whether it would be wise to create the
district prophylactically, even if other legitimate representational interests will suffer,
requires further analysis. If creating a majority-minority district will be very disruptive of
other representational interests, the jurisdiction should take a harder look at its potential
liability under section 2, perhaps looking beyond the preconditions to the totality of the
circumstances.
79. For example, it is a stretch of the community of interest concept to argue that
black residents of a rural county and black residents of an urban neighborhood in a
different county constitute a single community of interest, even if they reside in contiguous
areas and are plausibly viewed as geographically compact.
80. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,141 (1976).
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"clear majority of a district's registered voters,"'" and also of blacks as
"a majority of a district's population" in the plan that had been
submitted for preclearance. Because the prior "benchmark" plan in
Beer did not have any district satisfying either of these conditions, the
Court found the new plan, which did, to be "ameliorative. '
In
Abrams v. Johnson, the Court implied that a black district was one in
which blacks constitute an actual majority of the population,
Dictum in Vera, however, can be read as supporting a conclusion that
a black district is one in which a black candidate has in fact been
elected.'
As a practical matter, the important definition is the one the
Justice Department-the entity to which a covered jurisdiction must
submit its redistricting plan to obtain administrative preclearanceemploys. Clearly, the Department is bound to follow the law as
defined by the Supreme Court, but in the arguable absence of a clear
judicial definition of a minority district, the Department may be
emboldened to select any plausible measure that will permit it to find
retrogression."'
One commentator has observed that the
Department's new terminology is the nebulous "black opportunity
district"86 a concept encompassing at least all alternatives mentioned
above. It is entirely possible that the Department will, when it suits
its purposes, use the "functional analysis" suggested by Grofman,
Handley, and Lublin to define a black district.
When the Supreme Court is actually faced with defining a "black
district" for purposes of measuring retrogression, I predict that it will
adopt a "bright-line test"-perhaps concluding that a black district is
any district in which blacks are the majority of the voting age
population and any specific district in which a black support black
81. Id. at 141-42.
82. Id. at 141.
83. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 97-98 (1997).
84. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996).
85. Some of the courts hearing affirmative racial gerrymandering cases were openly
critical of the Department's coercing covered jurisdictions into creating majority-minority
districts when there was no feasible argument that these districts were necessary to avoid
retrogression. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924-25 (1995); Smith v. Beasley,
946 F. Supp. 1174, 1188 (D.S.C. 1996); Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1484 n.43
(N.D. Fla. 1996). See generally MAURICE CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER
THE COST (2001) (providing exhaustive documentation of the Department's pushing
jurisdictions to "maximize" the number of majority black districts in the redistricting
following the 1990 census).
86. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 85, at 88. My personal prediction is that, consistent
with its prior practices, the Department will look for any means to find retrogression if in
the opinion of its analysts the jurisdiction feasibly can draw a plan more favorable to
election of black candidates than the one submitted.
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candidate has been elected, regardless of the actual percentage of the

district's population that is black. Such a test would preserve both
potential black control and demonstrated black influence. A more
open-ended definition, such as one based on the district-by-district
functional analysis suggested by the principal authors, provides
virtually no guidance to covered jurisdictions, leaving them more than
ever at the mercy of the Justice DepartmentY
b. Must Retrogression Be Avoided at All Cost?
If, as is likely, the past decade of prosperity has resulted in
substantial numbers of minorities moving away from historically
black neighborhoods, jurisdictions may have genuine difficulty
maintaining their existing number of black districts. Moreover,
jurisdictions operating under post-1990 districts that were wildly
gerrymandered to make them majority black could face even greater
difficulty. The Supreme Court has not indicated whether these
jurisdictions must ignore, or further ignore, their standard districting
criteria to avoid retrogression. 88 The Shaw line of cases recognized
"compliance with section 5" as a justification for the use of race. The
cases hold, however, that to survive "strict scrutiny," race based
actions undertaken to comply with section 5 must be based on a
correct understanding of the preclearance requirements.8 9 The
87. A test that recognizes a district where black voters have actually elected a black
candidate as a "black district"-with the consequence that the existing black percentage of
the district itself would have to be preserved-is quite different from a test that defines a
"black district" as every district which an open-ended functional analysis suggests might
someday elect a black. Using this latter test, a jurisdiction with, say, two 48% black voting
age population districts, and two 45% black voting age population districts (none of which
had actually elected a black candidate, but might, according to a "functional analysis"),
would be required to produce four districts with similar black populations, but these new
districts would not necessarily have to be modifications of the old districts.
88. The Justice Department has provided its answer, however. In guidelines
concerning redistricting and retrogression, released January 18, 2001, the Justice
Department indicates that, unless the existing districting plan actually has been found to
be unconstitutional under the principles of Shaw v. Reno, it will evaluate the new
redistricting plan by comparing it to the existing plan, without considering the possible
unconstitutionality of the existing plan. Moreover, a retrogressive plan will not be
precleared if a less retrogressive plan can be created, even if the less retrogressive plan has
total deviations from population equality of up to 10%, and even if the jurisdiction must
depart from some of its districting standards to accomplish non-retrogression. Moreover,
incumbency protection and preservation of partisan balance must also yield. See 66 Fed.
Reg. 5412 (Jan. 18, 2001). It remains to be seen whether the Department's position will
accomplish its apparent goal of freezing in place a number of minority districts that were
created only because it used its preclearance authority to coerce covered jurisdictions to
engaged in unconstitutional gerrymandering. See the discussion of the courts'
condemnation of this practice, supra note 85.
89. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 922.
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Supreme Court has not had an occasion to decide whether section 5
in fact requires any and all manner of gerrymandering to create black
districts if retrogression cannot otherwise be avoided. 90
Grofman, Handley, and Lublin's "functionally effective black
district" is perhaps more attractive as a substitute for an actual black
majority district when the jurisdiction faces retrogression that is
unavoidable because of population shifts over the past decade.
Unlike section 2, section 5's anti-retrogression mandate is not
dependent upon proof that white bloc voting prevents the election of
candidates favored by the minority. Rather, section 5 affects a
prophylactic freezing in place of the minority's existing ability to
control electoral outcomes, perchance a lessening of its control might
result in loss of influence. But when loss of influence (as measured by
the number of black districts) appears inevitable, substituting a
greater number of districts in which blacks are not a majority, but
nevertheless retain their ability to elect candidates of their choice,
better advances the freezing principle than would retaining a lesser
number of actual black majority districts.
A covered jurisdiction faces an obvious dilemma if it is unable to

satisfy the Department's requirements for preclearance without
engaging in significant racial gerrymandering. There is no appeal
from the Department's decision denying preclearance. A covered
jurisdiction's statutory alternative to administrative preclearance is a
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia,91 a time-consuming, expensive, and often
90. Language in two of the Supreme Court's post-Shaw decisions suggests that the
non-retrogression standard may have to be modified in situations where the existing
number of minority districts cannot be maintained without extreme gerrymandering. In
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), Texas attempted to justify its non-standard majority
African-American district as necessary to avoid retrogression because the group's portion
of the electorate had declined since the last census. The Court rejected the district for
other reasons, but noted in response to this particular argument that "[n]on retrogression
is not a license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued
electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's opportunity to elect
representative of its choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's action."
Id.at 1963. Further support comes from similar comments (also dicta) in Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997). Abrams involved a court-drawn congressional districting
plan for Georgia, which contained only one majority black district. The lower court failed
to include a second such district because it was not possible to do so without subjugation
of the state's other districting criteria to race. Id. at 91. The Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's plan, but in a manner which made it unnecessary actually to decide whether
gerrymandering was permissible in order to avoid retrogression. Id. at 90. The Court did,
however, voice approval of the lower court's conclusion that a second African-American
district could not be created consistent with the constitution. Id. at 91.
91. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994)).
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politically difficult choice. One alternative is to do nothing, which
ultimately will lead to a local federal court's imposition of its own
plan on the jurisdiction. Finally, it can acquiesce in the Department's
demands to engage in further race-based districting, but in so doing,
create the risk that the precleared plan will subsequently be
invalidated on Shaw grounds.
The ultimate solution to this problem is for the Justice
Department not to adopt an unreasonable interpretation of the
Supreme Court's preclearance standards. Perhaps with a new
administration, policy-makers in the Justice Department will
reconsider the propriety of the nation's law enforcement agency
avoiding the mandates of the Supreme Court, arguably
disingenuously. 92 In the meantime, after the financially and politically
expensive experiences of jurisdictions such as North Carolina,
Georgia, and Texas, which elected to acquiesce, covered jurisdictions
may want to reevaluate the option of judicial preclearance.
CONCLUSION

Grofman, Handley, and Lublin's exploration of the factors that
impact how black a district must be to elect a black candidate
predictably is an important step toward a more politically functional
analysis of this issue. Ultimately, however, the first question is not
the optimal, or even minimal, circumstances for electing black
candidates, but rather is whether black candidates lose on account of
race. On this point, much of the principal authors' analysis suggests
that black candidates often win and lose for reasons that are
consistent with the normal operation of the political process. In my
Response, I have argued that a more qualitative analysis might reveal
that losing for political reasons, rather than racial ones, is the norm
for black candidates today-a distinction that is critical when courts
consider racial vote dilution claims and legislators contemplate using
race to create districts.
The reader should be cautioned not to be misled by the fact that
the Principal Article and my Response focused on the election of
92. Note, however, the Department adopted the "maximization of black districts"
principle during the last Bush administration. Maurice Cunningham opines that the
Department's Voting Section is much demoralized after a decade of defeats at the hand of
the Supreme Court's conservative majority. Indeed, he is concerned that the Voting
Section's lawyers may be too cautious in the future in doing their jobs. CUNNINGHAM,
supra note 85, at 155. On this point, I must disagree. The Department's recent notice
concerning guidance for redistricting suggests to me that the Voting Section will continue
to pressure jurisdictions to "maximize" black electoral opportunities. See supra note 88.
It will just do so less blatantly, probably by creatively defining "retrogression."
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black candidates. Before the last round of redistrictings, legislators
were told that the Voting Rights Act required them to create as many
majority black districts as physically possible. That advice was
incorrect and resulted in endless, expensive, and divisive litigation. I
see in the Principal Article the seeds of yet another round of bad
advice. This time legislators will be advised that the Voting Rights
Act requires jurisdictions to create as many districts as feasible that
can be counted on to elect a black candidate. The Constitution,
however, imposes strict limits on the states' intentional assignment of
citizens to districts on the basis of race, no matter what percentage of
the districts' electorate those so assigned constitute.
The states' safer course of action is to create districts using race
neutral criteria-criteria that are sufficiently flexible to permit each
jurisdiction to achieve most of its interests, including preserving black
incumbents and providing black communities with a chance to elect
candidates of their choice. Only then should it consider whether
some use of race is necessary to avoid potential liability under the
Voting Rights Act.

